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Abstract 
Bilateral relations between the European Union (EU) and countries of the so-called 
Southern Neighbourhood are one of the key channels of international cooperation in 
the Mediterranean region. The present contribution analyses EU instruments of 
bilateral cooperation forming the backbone of relations with countries of the southern 
dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and places them in the 
specific context of each EU partner country. The paper proceeds by examining, first, 
the historical development of institutionalisation of EU-Mediterranean relations; 
second, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs), ENP action 
plans and mobility partnerships, as key instruments of bilateral cooperation; and 
third, the idiosyncratic properties of each bilateral relationship on a country-by-
country basis. Despite relying on a set of similar instruments, bilateral relations 
between the EU and Mediterranean countries are to an extent marked by 
differentiation reflecting the distinct conditions of each bilateral relationship. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At the risk of opening this contribution with a cliché, it must be recognized from the 
outset that much of the Mediterranean region, particularly where it overlaps with the 
Middle East and North Africa (‘MENA’), finds itself in continued turmoil. Beset by 
military conflicts, terrorism, underdevelopment and political crises, the public 
association of the region with widespread human tragedy has been only 
strengthened in the last decade. During the same period, and in a number of cases 
linked to the events in the MENA, the European Union (‘EU’ or ‘Union’) has 
experienced its own share of crises. The two sides of the common Mediterranean 
neighbourhood have most notably come together in the migrant and refugee crisis 
that has dramatically spilled over the EU’s borders in 2015. Although the present 
contribution has the relatively modest objective of presenting the legal-institutional 
framework in bilateral relations between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours, it 
still cannot do without at least acknowledging the high degree of political, social and 
economic volatility present throughout the region. 
The extent to which legal and policy instruments of bilateral cooperation can 
generate legal certainty in times of profound crises is, to say the least, uncertain. The 
utility of formal instruments is bound to be circumscribed in view of, for example, 
abrupt power transitions or rapidly changing foreign policy interests. This might 
partially explain the widely reported failure of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(‘ENP’) which, while not solely attributable to factors external to the policy, was not 
helped by momentous contextual changes, many of which were impossible to 
foresee at the time of the ENP’s inception in 2004. In any case, despite some 
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pervasive regional dynamics, the situation on the ground differs markedly not only 
between the eastern and southern dimension of the ENP but also within the 
Mediterranean region. 
In principle, the evolving differences between countries – and more primarily 
differences in their treatment by the EU – could be accommodated through the 
application of the principle of differentiation, a cornerstone of the ENP which has 
been strengthened, at least on paper, in the 2011 and 2015 revisions of the policy.1 
The extent to which the EU translates the principle of differentiation into practice, 
however, has been disputed in scholarly literature.2 The present contribution 
discusses the formalized aspects of bilateral cooperation between the EU and 
countries of the southern dimension of the ENP and queries the degree of 
differentiation found therein.3 We will also highlight the distinctive challenges each 
bilateral relationship must grapple with. 
The paper proceeds first by briefly looking at the historical development leading to 
the current institutional framework. Second, it analyses in general three main 
instruments used in bilateral relations between the EU and Mediterranean countries: 
association agreements, ENP action plans and mobility partnerships. Third, it 
examines the specificities of bilateral arrangements in place on a country-by-country 
basis. Finally, we conclude with a few observations on the degree of differentiation 
made possible by the bilateral institutional framework. 
2. INSTITUTIONALISATION OF EU-MEDITERRANEAN BILATERAL RELATIONS IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Prior to the 1990s, four structural factors can be seen as shaping in general the 
possibilities of Mediterranean cooperation: the state of European integration, past 
colonial relationships, the bipolar logic of the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflicts. 
The confluence of these factors yielded only modest cooperative outcomes. 
Despite establishing an association, the first bilateral agreements signed between 
the European Economic Community (‘EEC’) and Morocco and Tunisia in 1969 for a 
period of five years were limited in scope to the liberalisation of trade in goods.4 The 
agreements provided only weak institutional frameworks: they intended to do no 
more than open the Community market to industrial goods and give preferential 
treatment to some of the less contentious agricultural products.5 Non-preferential 
trade agreements with Israel, one of the first countries to establish diplomatic 
relations with the EEC, and Lebanon, were signed even earlier (in 1964 and 1965 
                                               
1
 See, in general, Esther Barbé and Anna Herranz-Surrallés (eds), The Challenge of Differentiation in 
Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Flexible Regional Cooperation or Fragmentation (Routledge 2013). 
2
 See, for example, Tobias Schumacher and Dimitris Bouris, ‘The 2011 Revised European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy’ in Dimitris Bouris and Tobias 
Schumacher (eds), The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU 
Foreign Policy (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 16-17. 
3
 The focus on the ENP regrettably excludes other Mediterranean countries, most notably Turkey, as 
well as some Member States of the Union for the Mediterranean, such as Montenegro and Mauritania. 
Moreover, the contribution does not look at developments in those States that later acceded to the EU. 
4
 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom 
of Morocco [1969] OJ L197/5 (in French); Agreement establishing an Association between the 
European Economic Community and the Republic of Tunisia [1969] OJ L198/95 (in French). The 
association agreements were not comparable in scope with those concluded by the EEC with Greece 
and Turkey in 1961 and 1963 respectively, which in addition included signs of a membership 
perspective. 
5
 Richard Bailey, The European Connection: Implications of EEC Membership (Pergamon Press 1983) 
191. 
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respectively), but harboured no more ambition.6 Next to these legal relations there 
were more obscure international agreements, such as the one on food aid provision 
to Tunisia.7 
The EEC attempted to instil a degree of strategy and coherence into its 
Mediterranean approach in 1972 with the launch of the Global Mediterranean Policy.8 
Similarly to the discussions of differentiation in the ENP today, the heterogeneity of 
the 17 Mediterranean countries included in the ‘global’ policy was not lost on 
contemporary commentators.9 In concrete terms, the policy entailed the conclusion of 
more encompassing international agreements with more broadly worded objectives 
than merely trade expansion, such as social and economic development.10 They 
were agreed  both with countries which already had a contractual relationship with 
the EEC as well as with those which did not.11 Apart from preferential access, this 
new wave of bilateral treaties – termed ‘cooperation agreements’ – provided for 
economic aid through protocols on financial and technical cooperation.12 Protocols 
were agreed for a period of five years and comprised both direct budget lines and 
loans from the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’). 
The 1970s also saw the establishment of a political dialogue between EEC Member 
States and Arab countries. The dialogue came about primarily as a result of the twin 
forces of advancing European integration, with the launch of the European Political 
Cooperation – the predecessor of the CFSP – and the worsening situation in the 
Middle East that witnessed the 1973 oil embargo and the Yom Kippur war.13 
Although the Euro-Arab dialogue has not been considered a particular success,14 not 
least because of its swift suspension following the 1978 Camp David Accords and 
                                               
6
 Trade Agreement between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel [1964] OJ 
P95/1518 (in French); Agreement on Trade and Technical Cooperation between the European 
Economic Community and the Republic of Lebanon [1968] OJ L146/2 (in French). A slightly more 
comprehensive trade agreement was signed with Israel in 1970: see Agreement between the European 
Economic Community and the State of Israel [1970] OJ L183/1 (in French). Lebanon had also signed a 
similar agreement on 18 December 1972, but it did not subsequently ratify it. 
7
 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Tunisia on the supply of 
common wheat as food aid [1969] OJ L290/13 (in French). 
8
 Statement from the Paris Summit, 19-21 October 1972, Bull. EC. 10/1972 establishing Global 
Mediterranean Policy. 
9
 Loukas Tsoukalis, ‘The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is “Global” Policy a Misnomer?’ (1977) 53 
International Affairs 422, 423. 
10
 See, for example, Article 1 of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria [1978] OJ L263/2: ‘The object of this 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and Algeria is to promote overall cooperation 
between the Contracting Parties with a view to contributing to the economic and social development of 
Algeria and helping to strengthen relations between the Parties. To this end provisions and measures 
will be adopted and implemented in the field of economic, technical and financial cooperation, and in the 
trade and social fields.’ 
11
 To the chagrin of the Arab countries, the first such agreement was concluded with Israel. The 
Commission countered that this was purely by historical accident and that in any case the concessions 
granted to Israel were lesser than those offered to other countries in the MENA region. See Simon H 
Langer, ‘The Israel-EEC Free Trade Agreement: An Analysis of the Agreement and Its Effect on 
Investments’ (1982) 9 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 63, 84. 
12
 Four protocols on financial and technical cooperation were signed before the cooperation agreements 
were replaced by Euro-Mediterranean agreements. Most protocols entered into force in successive 
rounds in 1978, 1982, 1988, 1992. Financing under the protocols was later substituted by the MEDA 
instruments. 
13
 These factors had also undoubtedly inserted a sense of urgency into the Global Mediterranean Policy. 
See Soren von Dosenrode and Anders Stubkjaer, The European Union and the Middle East (Sheffield 
Academic Press 2002) 87. 
14
 See, for example, Haifaa Jawad, Euro-Arab Relations: A Study in Collective Diplomacy (Ithaca 1993) 
160. 
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failure to realize proposed projects,15 the fact that it was set up at all and attained 
some degree of institutionalisation (a General Committee was to meet twice a year) 
in the face of numerous difficulties, ranging from recognition of the PLO to exclusion 
of sensitive political issues, was an achievement in itself.16 
It was only with the end of the Cold War that new possibilities for cooperation opened 
up in the Mediterranean region. The EU started off this era with the so-called 
Redirected (or New) Mediterranean Policy, which enhanced both the preferential 
trade aspect of the existing policy and substantially increased financial contributions 
through renewed financial protocols for the period 1992-1996.17 Even though the 
policy also added other elements, such as more support for regional integration in 
the Southern Mediterranean and elementary engagement with civil society, it was not 
essentially different from its forerunner.18 
The real institutional breakthrough, which has framed EU-Mediterranean cooperation 
ever since, came in 1995 in the form of the Barcelona Declaration.19 It endeavoured 
to create a comprehensive multilateral forum for the whole Mediterranean region by 
establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (‘EMP’), also called the Barcelona 
Process.20 The EMP comprised three seemingly equal baskets of partnerships: 
political and security; economic and financial; and social, cultural and human. In 
reality, it was clear from the outset that cooperation on political and security issues 
would be highly contentious and difficult to achieve.21 On the other hand, the 
continued and even enhanced emphasis on economic liberalisation of the Barcelona 
Declaration was perceived (presciently) with scepticism by some scholars in view of 
potential destabilising effects, which seemed to run counter to the security-through-
development logic underpinning the process.22 Overall, it was the failure to realize 
the proclaimed all-inclusive nature and ambition of the Barcelona Process – it aimed 
inter alia to establish a free trade area by 2010 – that made it later subject to 
considerable criticism.23 
In any case, the launch of the multilateral EMP did not spell death for EU-MENA 
bilateralism. On the contrary, it added impetus to the process of renegotiation of 
                                               
15
 European Commission, The European Community and the Arab world (Europe Information: 
Development DE 38, June 1982) 33. 
16
 Alan R Taylor, ‘The Euro-Arab Dialogue: Quest for an Interregional Partnership’ (1978) 32 Middle 
East Journal 429, 443. 
17
 Bichara Khader, ‘The European Union and the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty to the Arab Spring’ 
(2013) PapersIEMed 17, 15. 
18
 Ricardo Gomez, ‘The EU’s Mediterranean policy: common foreign policy by the back door?’ in John 
Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: Competing visions of the 
CFSP (Routledge 1998) 140. 
19
 Final Declaration of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, 27-28 November 
1995, Bull. EU 11/1995, 136. The Declaration was signed by the 15 EU Member States and 12 
neighbouring Mediterranean partners. The financial resources for the EMP came from the so-called 
MEDA instruments, which were de facto predecessors to the ENPI and ENI following the creation of the 
ENP. See, for example, Council Regulation (EC) 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical 
measures to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership [1996] OJ L189/1. 
20
 Originally, a more circumscribed initiative for only North African countries was envisaged. The signing 
of the 1993 Oslo Accords, however, enabled the EU to expand the process. 
21
 Esther Barbé, ‘The Barcelona conference: Launching pad of a process’ (1996) 1 Mediterranean 
Politics 25. 
22
 Eberhard Kienle, ‘Destabilization through partnership? Euro‐Mediterranean relations after the 
Barcelona declaration’ (1998) 2 Mediterranean Politics 1; Jon Marks, ‘High hopes and low motives: The 
new euro‐mediterranean partnership initiative’ (1996) 1 Mediterranean Politics 1. 
23
 See, for example, A.P. Vallelersundi, ‘The Barcelona Process - A Euro-Mediterranean North-South 
Partnership’, (2004) 5 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 145, 147; Raffaella Del Sarto and 
Tobias Schumacher, ‘From EMP to ENP: What’s at stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy 
towards the Southern Mediterranean?’ (2005) 10 European Foreign Affairs Review 17. 
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existing bilateral agreements, which had already started prior to the Barcelona 
Conference. The Barcelona Declaration itself stated that it regarded ‘this multilateral 
framework as the counterpart to a strengthening of bilateral relations which it is 
important to safeguard’.24 In light of the non-binding character of the Declaration, 
however, a more cynical perspective could point out that rather than being ‘the 
counterpart’, the multilateral framework of the EMP was hollow without the muscle of 
the bilateral agreements.25 
The third generation of association agreements accompanying the Barcelona 
Process are generally known as the Euro-Mediterranean agreements establishing 
association (‘EMAAs’), which are still in force today.26 As with most association 
agreements, their legal basis in the EU Treaties is Article 217 TFEU (formerly Article 
310 TEC).27 In keeping with the objectives of the EMP, the EMAAs are 
comprehensive treaties covering many more aspects of bilateral cooperation than 
merely trade, such as regular political dialogue, justice and home affairs or social and 
cultural cooperation. EMAAs also include human rights and democracy clauses as 
essential elements of the agreements, although these clauses have never been 
invoked to suspend the agreements.28 When it comes to the economic chapters of 
the EMAAs, the focus was at first firmly on trade in (industrial) goods, while other 
regulatory areas (intellectual property rights, public procurement, etc.) were included 
or developed only gradually through additional protocols. However, even such 
‘enhanced’ EMAAs fall short of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements (‘DCFTAs’) agreed by the EU with some Eastern Partnership 
countries.29 Following the Arab Spring, DCFTA negotiations have begun with 
Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. 
Taking into account the historical path of institutionalization chronicled so far, it 
should not come as a surprise that the ENP has not significantly altered the relative 
importance of bilateral cooperation and corresponding international agreements. The 
principle of differentiation, introduced by the ENP primarily through the so-called 
Action Plans, has merely reinforced the perception that bilateralism takes 
precedence over multilateralism and regionalism in Euro-Mediterranean relations.30 
However, the strengthening of differentiated bilateralism, particularly by the 2011 and 
2015 reviews of the ENP, has led to questions over whether the legal framework of 
EMAAs can keep up or whether it is being overtaken by political commitments.31 In 
any case, the overlapping governance structures of the Barcelona Process and the 
                                               
24
 Final Declaration of the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, 27-28 November 
1995, Bull. EU 11/1995, 136. 
25
 Fouad Zaim, ‘The third generation of Euro‐Mediterranean association agreements: A view from the 
south’ (1999) 4 Mediterranean Politics 36, 39-40. 
26
 Euro-Mediterranean Agreements were concluded establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and, respectively, Tunisia [1998] OJ L79/2; 
Morocco [2000] OJ L70/2; Jordan [2002] OJ L129/3; Egypt [2004] OJ L304/39; and Algeria [2005] OJ 
L265/2. An agreement with Syria was initialled in 2004 and again in 2008 but not formally signed or 
ratified. Negotiations regarding a framework agreement with Libya have begun in 2008 but were 
suspended in 2011 due to destabilization. 
27
 One notable exception was Israel’s cooperation agreement of 1975 which had as its legal basis the 
common commercial policy (then Article 113 of the EEC Treaty). An argument has been made, 
however, that the agreement was in nature closer to an association agreement. See Langer (n 3) 86. 
28
 Lorand Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (Oxford University 
Press 2005); Barbara Brandtner and Allan Rosas, ‘Trade preferences and human rights’ in Philip Alston, 
Mara Bustelo and James Heenan (eds), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 1999). 
29
 Peter Van Elsuwege and Guillaume Van der Loo, ‘Continuity and Change in the Legal Relations 
Between the EU and Its Neighbours: A Result of Path Dependency and Spill-over Effects’ in Bouris and 
Schumacher (n 2) 107. 
30
 Tobias Schumacher, ‘Conditionality, Differentiation, Regionality and the “New” ENP in the Light of 
Arab Revolts’, in Barbé and Herranz-Surrallés (n 1) 148. 
31
 ibid. 
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ENP have been most recently further complicated by the establishment of the Union 
for the Mediterranean (‘UfM’), where multilateral cooperation is institutionalized 
(permanent Secretariat in Barcelona) and functionalist (driven by projects).32 Yet, 
bilateralism in the region stands as strong as ever.33 
3. EU INSTRUMENTS OF BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE SOUTHERN NEIGHBOURHOOD 
For all the rhetoric about differentiation in academic and policy circles, the EU’s 
toolkit for bilateral cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean countries revolves 
around only a handful of legal and policy instruments. Nonetheless, as a result of 
strategic considerations, the EU has been able to update some of the instruments 
throughout the years, such as the association agreements, while also being able to 
introduce novel tools, such as the mobility partnerships. The following paragraphs 
look at three important bilateral instruments, but many more international 
agreements, mostly of a technical nature, form part of the bilateral legal 
environment.34 
A. Association Agreements  
As mentioned above, currently in force in all southern neighbourhood countries with 
the exception of Syria and Libya are the EMAAs. They represent the backbone of the 
whole network of bilateral relationships of the EU with third partners in the 
Mediterranean region. Although the EMAAs represent the most comprehensive legal 
framework for bilateral relations in the region to date, they are still a far cry from the 
agreements already concluded by the EU with some of the countries of the eastern 
dimension of the ENP.35 In addition, while some differences in language, emphasis 
or trade concessions between the various EMAAs exist, the overall template and key 
characteristics of the agreements are shared. 
While most features of the EMAAs are not novel or unique, that does not lessen their 
importance for bilateral relations. One such longstanding cornerstone of association 
agreements with the EU is the creation of association councils and committees, 
which can be found in each EMAA under the title on institutional provisions. The 
councils and committees represent in essence the institutionalisation of political 
dialogue – which itself is also explicitly prescribed in EMAAs, but not limited to the 
meetings of the association council – between the EU and third countries. 
Representation in association councils consisted prior to the Treaty of Lisbon of 
members of the Council of the EU and of the European Commission, on the one 
hand, and members of the government of the partner country, on the other. Today, 
the role of the Council of the EU is fulfilled by the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the support of the European External 
Action Service (‘EEAS’).36 Nonetheless, the Council, in accordance with Article 
218(9) TFEU, still adopts a decision on the common EU position to be taken in the 
                                               
32
 Paul James Cardwell, ‘EuroMed, European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the 
Mediterranean: Overlapping Policy Frames in the EU’s Governance of the Mediterranean’ (2011) 49 
Journal of Common Market Studies 219. 
33
 Raffaella Del Sarto, ‘Plus ça change…? Israel, the EU and the Union for the Mediterranean’ (2011) 16 
Mediterranean Politics 117, 133-134; Oliver Schlumberger, ‘The Ties that do not Bind: The Union for the 
Mediterranean and the Future of Euro-Arab Relations’ (2011) 16 Mediterranean Politics 135, 144. 
34
 To name a few: agreements on conformity assessment and acceptance of Industrial Products 
(‘ACAAs’); technology and science agreements, aviation agreements, readmission and visa facilitation 
agreements, fisheries partnership agreements, agriculture and fisheries protocols. These are de facto 
separate treaties, but they are often attached to the core legal framework – the EMAA – as a protocol. 
35
 Van Elsuwege and Van der Loo (n 29) 107. 
36
 The High Representative may still delegate its representative role to an EU Member State, normally 
the holder of the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU. 
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association council. Association councils are chaired by each party in turn, operate 
according to their own rules of procedure, and should meet at least once a year at 
the ministerial level.37 In practice, meetings of the councils may be postponed, most 
often due to a downturn in bilateral relations. Association councils may also set up ad 
hoc working groups for the implementation of the EMAAs, or delegate their powers to 
association committees which bring together officials of the EU, represented by the 
EEAS, and of the government of the partner country. 
Crucially, association councils and committees can take binding decisions for the 
purpose of attaining the objectives of EMAAs, which must be implemented by the 
parties. The provisions of the association agreements specify the matters that require 
the adoption of a decision or a non-binding recommendation by the association 
council.38 EMAAs furthermore allow association councils to act as a dispute 
settlement body for the parties to the agreement. Binding decisions in disputes are 
adopted after the appointment of arbitrators. 
An important novel aspect brought about by EMAAs was the inclusion of respect for 
democratic principles and human rights as ‘essential element’ clauses in the 
agreement. Such clauses have become part and parcel of practically all international 
agreements concluded by the EU since the 1990s. The wording of the clauses differs 
among the EMAAs, but it ultimately binds the parties to respect human rights and 
democratic norms as part of the agreements.39 By constituting an essential element 
of the EMAAs, the democracy and human rights clauses could serve as a basis for 
the suspension of the agreement or for taking any other ‘appropriate measures’ 
(‘non-execution clause’).40 Lorand Bartels formulated an argument in support of this 
conclusion but his analysis also pointed to counter-arguments, and as such, the 
legality of a potential exercise of the non-execution clause on the basis of human 
rights violations could be disputed.41 
In order to obtain an overview of the level of differentiation among the various 
EMAAs, it is worth looking at the objectives enshrined in Article 1 of each of the 
agreements and point to their similarities and differences. Table 1 deconstructs the 
objectives and identifies the commonalities and differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
37
 The frequency of meetings of the association council tends to reflect the state of the bilateral 
relations. See, for example, Vera Van Hüllen, ‘Europeanisation through Cooperation? EU Democracy 
Promotion in Morocco and Tunisia’ (2012) 35 West European Politics 117. 
38
 See, for example, Articles 64 and 65 of the EU-Israel EMAA, which require a decision by the 
association council in matters of social security. 
39
 One of the more significant differences is the reference to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(‘UDHR’) in all but the Tunisian EMAA (Article 2), which refers to the domestic and international practice 
of the parties.  
40
 See, for example, Article 79 of the EU-Israel EMAA. Such provisions can be, however, found in all the 
EMAAs. 
41
 Lorand Bartels, ‘A Legal Analysis of Human Rights Clauses in the European Union’s Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreements’ (2004) 9 Mediterranean Politics 368. 
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Table 1: Comparison of objectives in Article 1 of EMAAs 
Topic Wording of objectives EMAA with … Divergent wording 
Political 
dialogue 
provide an appropriate framework 
for political dialogue, allowing the 
development of close political 
relations between the Parties 
Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan 
Palestine: provide an 
appropriate framework […] 
allowing the development of 
close political relations 
between the Parties 
provide an appropriate framework 
for political dialogue, allowing the 
development of close relations 
and cooperation in all areas 
they consider relevant to such 
dialogue 
Algeria, 
Lebanon, 
Morocco, 
Tunisia 
 
Trade 
liberalization 
establish conditions for the 
progressive/gradual liberalization 
of trade in goods, services and 
capital 
Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan, 
Lebanon, 
Morocco, 
Tunisia 
Palestine: establish the 
conditions for the progressive 
liberalization of trade 
through the expansion, inter alia, 
of trade in goods and services, 
the reciprocal liberalization of the 
right of establishment, the 
further progressive liberalization 
of public procurement, the free 
movement of capital and the 
intensification of cooperation in 
science and technology to 
promote the harmonious 
development … 
Israel  
Development / 
Improvement 
of living 
standards 
promote trade and the expansion 
of harmonious economic and 
social relations between the 
Parties, notably through dialogue 
and cooperation, so as to foster 
the development and prosperity 
of Lebanon/Morocco/Tunisia and 
its people 
Lebanon, 
Morocco, 
Tunisia 
Algeria: promote trade and the 
expansion of harmonious 
economic and social relations 
between the Parties 
contribute to the economic and 
social development of Egypt/the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip 
Egypt, Palestine  
improve living and employment 
conditions, and enhance 
Jordan Israel: foster in the Community 
and in Israel the advance of 
11 
 
productivity and financial stability economic activity, the 
improvement of living and 
employment conditions, and 
increased productivity and 
financial stability 
Regional 
integration / 
cooperation 
encourage integration of the 
Maghreb countries by promoting 
trade and cooperation between 
Morocco/Tunisia and other 
countries of the region 
Morocco, 
Tunisia 
Algeria: encourage […] trade 
and cooperation within the 
Maghreb group and between 
it and the Community and its 
Member States 
encourage regional cooperation 
with a view to the consolidation of 
peaceful coexistence and 
economic and political stability 
Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, 
Palestine 
Lebanon: no objective of 
regional integration or 
cooperation 
Economic, 
social, cultural 
and financial 
cooperation / 
relations 
promote economic, social, cultural 
and financial cooperation 
Algeria, 
Morocco, 
Tunisia 
Lebanon: promote […] 
cultural, financial and 
monetary cooperation 
foster the development of 
balanced economic and social 
relations between the Parties 
through dialogue and cooperation 
Egypt, Jordan, 
Palestine 
Israel: promote the 
harmonious development of 
economic relations between 
the Community and Israel 
Cooperation in 
other areas 
promote cooperation in other 
areas which are of reciprocal 
interest 
Israel, Jordan, 
Palestine 
Egypt, Lebanon: promote […] 
which are of mutual interest 
 
It is clear from the overview of the objectives that a degree of differentiation is 
present in the EMAAs. The level of differentiation should not be overstated, though: 
often the differences stem from minor linguistic modifications that are most likely 
inconsequential in terms of legal or political impact.42 The same is in fact true for the 
rest of the text of the EMAAs, where a plethora of minor discrepancies in language 
can be found among the agreements. 
What such minor – but also the more obvious – divergences can testify to is the fact 
that each agreement is a result of an individual bilateral negotiation which, to a 
varying extent, reflects some of the idiosyncrasies of that particular bilateral 
relationship between the EU and the partner country. Arguably the most dissimilar 
Article 1 is the one in Israel’s EMAA. This appears to echo that Israel is by far the 
most developed country in the region with an already well-established trade 
relationship with the EU. The trade liberalisation objective is therefore much more 
concrete than those contained in other EMAAs. Elsewhere, subtle linguistic nuances 
capture the regional sensitivities: whereas the regional objectives of the Maghreb 
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countries aim for integration, the agreements of the Mashreq countries strive for 
peaceful coexistence in view of the Israeli-Palestinian question. 
The differences found among the objectives are in general eclipsed by the shared 
commonalities of EMAAs and their objectives. In other words, the EMAAs constitute 
a single instrument of legal bilateralism involving the EU and Southern 
Mediterranean countries with a set structure and purpose. Any differences, as can be 
seen in the objectives, are accommodated within the common structure. The same 
wording of individual objectives is normally replicated across a number of EMAAs. In 
some cases, the text of Article 1 is entirely identical (Morocco and Tunisia) or nearly 
identical (Palestine and Egypt). Even where deviations exist, these still fall under the 
same set of topics towards which the EMAAs are geared.43 The uniformity of EMAAs 
also points to the predominant position of the EU in the bilateral negotiations. 
B. ENP Action Plans 
ENP action plans (‘APs’) are one of the main innovations of the ENP when it comes 
to instruments of bilateral cooperation available to the Union. APs are in essence 
political agreements between the EU and the partner country which set out the 
agenda and priorities for the bilateral relationship in the short- to medium- term (three 
to five years) with a view to implement the broader objectives of the association 
agreement. Despite being adopted by association councils, APs are not legally 
binding; rather, they ‘give orientation’ for cooperation between the EU and the 
partner country.44 The association council, and any other designated body 
established under the association agreements, is also responsible for monitoring and 
aiding the implementation of the APs. As a result of this embeddedness in the overall 
legal framework of the association agreements,45 APs are only adopted once the 
contractual bilateral relationship is already in place. 
Even a cursory glance at the ENP APs agreed with Southern Mediterranean 
countries reveals that they have been overwhelmingly concerned with domestic 
reforms in the partner countries with few to no reciprocal commitments requiring 
internal adaptation of the EU.46 Instead, the EU has focused on providing (mainly 
financial) support and absorbing the ‘target’ countries within its external governance 
framework where desirable.47 Although the EU’s external governance is capable of 
spreading also in other ways,48 what is most often witnessed in the Mediterranean 
region is a ‘quid pro quo’ offered by the EU to the partner countries to incentivize 
implementation of the APs and EMAAs. The use of positive (providing aid, extending 
cooperation) or negative (withdrawing aid, suspending cooperation) conditionality, 
which has been relatively successful in the context of EU enlargement,49 has been 
deemed less successful in the context of the ENP.50 Positive conditionality has been 
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significantly enhanced in the wake of the Arab Spring, but on the whole the 
instruments relied upon by the EU have adapted precious little despite the marked 
change in context.51 
Similarly to EMAAs, APs in the Mediterranean region are comprehensive and cover a 
plethora of issue areas. Unlike EMAAs, however, APs allow for more differentiation: 
the document is less of a straitjacket and the EU seeks to tailor the priorities of each 
AP in accordance with its interests and the specific situation in the partner country. 
The input and room for assertiveness on the part of the partner country in the 
negotiation of the AP depends on the relative power (im)balance (or 
presence/absence of leverage) and ranges from more equal partnerships (Israel, 
Algeria) to more deferential ones (Morocco, Tunisia).52 
The comprehensiveness of the APs and the difficulty of measuring many of their 
goals present a monitoring challenge for the European Commission, which evaluates 
the progress of the partner countries in delivering on the APs.53 In theory, the 
Commission progress reports should exert a large amount of influence over the 
decisions on the size of the EU’s (financial) support to the partner countries, as these 
are dispensed from unilateral EU financing instruments, chiefly the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (‘ENI’).54 In practice, there is evidence pointing to the 
more than occasional dissociation of Commission evaluations of progress – which in 
any case struggle with partiality and politicisation – from the eventual amount of EU 
funding disbursed to individual ENP countries.55 The problem is at its most acute 
when it comes to applying benchmarks to the stated objectives of APs to promote 
democratisation and human rights in the partner countries.56 The EU has promised in 
response to apply stricter conditionality and greater differentiation in both the latest 
ENP review and the ENI Regulation replacing the former European Neighbourhood 
Policy Instrument (‘ENPI’).57 Lately, the EU can be seen trying to deliver on its 
promise of greater differentiation – and of more joint ownership – by replacing APs 
with ‘partnership priorities’ (see below). At this point it remains to be seen whether 
the change from APs to partnership priorities will have a significant impact on 
bilateral relations around the Mediterranean. 
C. Mobility Partnerships 
Mobility partnerships (‘MPs’) were conceived together with the Global Approach to 
Migration in 2005 and have become an established part of the cooperation 
framework on migration since its subsequent revision as Global Approach to 
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Migration and Mobility in 2011.58 Geographically, the negotiation of MPs focuses on 
the EU neighbourhood, which, of course, includes the southern dimension of the 
ENP. So far, MPs were concluded with Morocco in 2013, and with Tunisia and 
Jordan in 2014.59 
MPs are in essence legally non-binding political declarations concluded between the 
EU and partner countries in order to establish a more specific framework for 
cooperation on migration issues than the general commitments provided for in 
association agreements.60 On the side of the EU, individual Member States may also 
decide to sign up to the political declaration and indeed a number of them have done 
so. The declarations are flexible in the sense that other EU Member States may join 
the MP, as well as because they constitute evolving documents by virtue of 
amendments to agreed-upon priorities, activities and projects. 
The MPs have a multi-layered character.61 They contain both political commitments 
with respect to various aspects of migration – perhaps most importantly, the parties 
commit to negotiate a visa facilitation and a readmission agreement – and a list of 
initiatives and projects to be implemented, involving the operational level. The 
implementation of the MPs is furthermore monitored by the parties in the context of 
an ongoing structured dialogue on migration and mobility, which has led to the 
conclusion of the MPs in the first place. The MPs are intended to represent an 
anchor for long-term cooperation and dialogue between the EU and partner countries 
in the area of migration.62 The bilateral dialogues take place concurrently with 
complementary regional dialogues supported by the EU and the intergovernmental 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development (‘ICMPD’), such as the Rabat 
Process and the Mediterranean Transit Management (‘MTM’) Dialogue. It should be 
noted, however, that the regional dialogues in migration governance in the 
Mediterranean have been criticized as haphazard and ineffective.63 
While MPs in theory allow the participating parties to determine their content 
bilaterally, the core objectives in all MPs hitherto concluded converge on a basic 
template with four pillars of cooperation: managing legal migration and labour 
market; enhancing the nexus between migration and development; combatting illegal 
immigration and smuggling, while promoting returns and readmission; and supporting 
the effectiveness and capacity for international protection of refugees. An effective 
implementation of these broad objectives is meant to deliver a ‘triple-win’ of ‘offering 
legal opportunities to migrants, supporting the development of countries of origin and 
supplying the EU countries with much needed skilled labour’.64 
However, not all the objectives are equal. From the perspective of the EU, which 
tends to dominate the partnerships, MPs are driven by a security imperative that 
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requires the stemming of illegal immigration and installation of a degree of control 
over migration flows.65 The commonality of objectives and of the overall text of the 
political declarations across the three MPs with Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan 
underscore the prevailing EU interest to establish the partnerships. This supports the 
argument that MPs are in the first place about the implementation of the EU’s 
external migration policy to which the expectations of neighbour countries must be 
fitted.66 Whereas the EU places strategic value on the management and curbs on 
illegal migration in the region,67 the three MENA countries which have so far entered 
into MPs with the EU have done so with a view to securing financial resources or 
improving labour mobility, not out of security concerns.68 More space for 
differentiation can be found in the project part of the MPs, where the types of 
initiatives agreed reflect better the demands of the EU’s partners as well as the 
involvement of different Member States.69 In any case, despite the misalignment of 
interests and perceptions, experience from pilot MPs has shown that the 
partnerships are at least beneficial for intensifying cooperation and putting emphasis 
on migration in bilateral relations.70 
4. KEY ISSUES IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE EU PER PARTNER 
Whereas the previous parts of this contribution looked more at the formal 
commonalities found in the bilateral relationships of the EU with Southern 
Mediterranean countries, the present section will highlight the key issues of each 
relationship. Although some countries are easier to cluster together than others, 
there are nonetheless distinctive specificities across the board, all of which have in 
some way influenced bilateral relations. It should go without saying that the list of 
highlighted issues below is not by any means exhaustive. 
 
A. Algeria 
Due to the peculiar ways of history, the territory of Algeria formed part of the original 
European Economic Community and was specifically mentioned in Article 227(2) 
EEC Treaty. Following Algeria’s independence from France in 1962, the country has 
signed a cooperation agreement with the EEC around the same time (1976) as most 
countries in the Mediterranean region, despite holding in general a more antagonistic 
stance vis-à-vis Europe than its neighbours in the Maghreb, Morocco and Tunisia. 
What, however, distinguished Algeria the most from Morocco and Tunisia were the 
increasingly more prominent revenues from hydrocarbons. Energy trade remains to 
this day the single most important determinant in EU-Algeria relations and one which 
has manifested itself also in the formal side of the bilateral relationship. Unlike its 
neighbours, Algeria was able to derive a degree of leverage from the mutual 
                                               
65
 Peter Seeberg, ‘Mobility Partnerships and Security Subcomplexes in the Mediterranean: The 
Strategic Role of Migration and the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policies Towards the MENA 
Region’ (2017) 22 European Foreign Affairs Review 91, 108. 
66
 Noutcheva (n 51) 25. 
67
 To this end, the Commission has been since 2015 operating the Emergency Trust Fund for stability 
and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa. All the North African 
countries are eligible for funding under this scheme. 
68
 Although securitization was to some extent present in the case of Jordan, which hosts a large number 
of refugees and was involved in the war in Syria, the Jordanian government was chiefly keen on 
sustaining the financial support of the EU in the management of the refugee crisis. Seeberg (n 65) 108-
110. 
69
 Agnieszka Weiner, ‘Cooperation on Migration and the Revised European Neighbourhood Policy’ in 
Dimitris Bouris and Tobias Schumacher (n 2) 275. 
70
 Angenendt (n 64) 223. 
16 
 
interdependence with the EU which rests, on the one hand, on the centrality of 
energy exports for the Algerian domestic political economy, and on the other, on the 
EU’s considerable energy demands combined with a desire for differentiated and 
stable energy supply, which has been furthermore affected by tense relations with 
Russia.71 As a consequence – but linked more broadly to the interests of the Algerian 
political leadership –72 Algeria has been hesitant to subscribe to the formal bilateral 
instruments championed by the EU around the whole Mediterranean Sea. After 
finally signing an EMAA in 2002, Algeria has been for a number of years negotiating 
its first ENP AP, while its neighbours have already adopted two successive APs. 
Intransigence has been to some extent overcome when the two sides signed a 
memorandum establishing a strategic energy partnership in 2013, to which a high-
level dialogue on energy was added in 2015.73 
A more general uptick in EU-Algerian relations was the recent conclusion of a prima 
facie novel bilateral document entitled ‘Shared Partnership Priorities’.74 More than 
anything, the document is a statement of political commitment to the mutual bilateral 
relationship, as the priorities identified for the period 2018-2020 are hardly ground-
breaking. What is more important is that the EU appears to have responded to the 
criticism of the irrelevance of the prior frameworks for engagement with Algeria.75 It 
has also delivered on its promise to ‘discuss the possibility to jointly set new 
partnership priorities, which would focus each relationship more clearly on commonly 
identified shared interests’ by substituting the pursuit of the more rigid and onerous 
AP by the more streamlined partnership priorities.76 Accommodating in this way the 
‘Algerian specificity’ in the overall ENP framework is therefore a prime example of 
greater differentiation avowed in the 2015 revision of the ENP.77 
B. Egypt 
In the past decade, the political leadership of Egypt has swung from authoritarian to 
democratic before a military coup d’état ousted the first democratically elected 
Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi. The subsequent election was accompanied by 
a crackdown on opposition and was won overwhelmingly by the former leader of the 
military coup, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi. Such political turmoil would represent a 
challenging environment for any international actor, including the EU. 
In line with its long-held position of ‘stability first’ in the Mediterranean, the EU has 
been keen on incorporating, as it has done also elsewhere, Egypt into its network of 
bilateral relations, despite the latter being long ruled by its authoritarian president 
Hosni Mubarak.78 Research has shown that in doing so, the EU’s behaviour has 
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been, for all its internal specificities,79 hardly different from other external actors in the 
region.80 
As a result, Egypt’s formal bilateral cooperation with the EU has for the most part 
pragmatically adhered to the regional standard, regardless of a frequent lack of 
enthusiasm. Although Egypt concluded both an EMAA (in 2001) and an AP (in 2007), 
it successfully resisted prior to the 2011 revolution any significant political reforms 
that would conform to the EU’s normative agenda. Similarly, the ENP framework first 
failed to contribute to the development of democratic movements in Egypt,81 and in 
the aftermath of the Arab Spring was unable to meaningfully bolster the momentous 
institutional change.82 Moreover, Egypt’s preference to focus on the trade and 
economic aspects of the bilateral relationship could have been witnessed in its 
reluctance to enter into negotiations and so far agree to a mobility partnership with 
the EU.83 As in the case of Algeria, EU-Egypt relations could potentially move 
forward thanks to greater differentiation under the revised ENP, specifically after, as 
expected, a declaration on partnership priorities will have been signed in 2017. 
C. Israel 
Israel is by far the most developed country in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. This 
means that the EU’s bilateral financial assistance is minimal – as opposed to the 
hundreds of millions of euros spent in aid in other partner countries – while the 
bilateral instruments in place focus on the more advanced aspects of trade 
expansion than is the case with other countries, as can be for example seen in the 
concrete wording of the trade objective in the EU-Israel EMAA (see Table 1 above). 
Israel has also been the first Mediterranean country to sign an agreement on 
conformity assessment and acceptance of industrial products (‘ACAA’) in 2010.84 The 
ACAA – concluded as an additional protocol to the EMAA – is an important step 
towards removing technical barriers to trade. So far, the only mutually recognized 
product under the agreement are pharmaceuticals. 
However, there is also inherent tension in the EU-Israel bilateral relationship, as a 
result of which the EU-Israel association council has not convened since 2012. The 
EU is one of the key supporters of Palestine and of the two-state solution in the 
Middle East Peace Process, as underlined in the instruments of bilateral cooperation 
applicable to EU-Palestine relations (see below). The EU recognizes, in line with 
international law, the June 1967 dividing line between the State of Israel and 
Palestinian territories. As a consequence, contrary to the interpretation found in 
Israeli domestic law, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including 
East Jerusalem are, in the perspective of the EU, not a part of Israeli territory. 
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The question of sovereign territories has, understandably, also very concrete 
implications for bilateral relations with the EU, particularly when it comes to trade.85 
As was made clear by the Court of Justice, products originating from Palestinian 
territories do not qualify for preferential treatment under the EU-Israel EMAA,86 nor 
can such goods be certified by Israeli customs authorities instead of the Palestinian 
authorities designated in the EU-PLO EMAA.87 Moreover, the Commission has 
published a non-binding interpretative notice on indication of origin of goods from 
occupied Palestinian territories, which recommends a clear indication of whether 
products originate from Palestine or from Israeli settlements in Palestine.88 This can 
be of particular relevance when the indication of origin is mandatory as a matter of 
EU consumer protection law.89 
D. Jordan 
Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, relations between the EU and Jordan have 
noticeably intensified. Jordan’s role in accommodating hundreds of thousands of 
Syrian refugees has been instrumental for the EU on account of its own migration 
quagmire and the resulting anti-immigration sentiments seeping into official EU 
policy. As for Jordan, the EU is its biggest trading partner and development aid 
donor. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that EU-Jordan cooperation is 
among the closest in the southern dimension of the ENP. Jordan has to date already 
signed up to an EMAA, two ENP action plans, an agreement on scientific and 
technological cooperation,90 an aviation agreement,91 and a mobility partnership. The 
two parties are furthermore in talks regarding a visa facilitation and readmission 
agreement in line with the objectives of the MP, in addition to negotiating a DCFTA 
and an ACAA. 
Most recently, and with some significance, the EU-Jordan association council 
adopted partnership priorities for the period 2016-2018, which replaced the second 
AP.92 The partnership priorities, born out of the 2015 ENP review, are accompanied 
by the so-called EU-Jordan Compact, which sets out ‘mutual commitments as well as 
review mechanisms’, and which intends to facilitate the implementation of the 
priorities. More precisely, the document is a political restatement of the international 
compact agreed at a conference in London in February 2016, which was organized 
with the purpose of mobilising international partners to provide vital assistance for 
dealing with the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis. The agreed-upon mutual 
commitments are often considerable and concrete: for example, in exchange for 
Jordan employing Syrians and educating Syrian refugee children, the EU has 
temporarily (until 2026) relaxed its rules of origin for specific products and in 
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designated economic zones benefitting Syrian refugees, in addition to a host of other 
trade and development measures.93  
E. Lebanon 
As a country with first-hand experience with the Syrian conflict and the ensuing 
refugee crisis, the situation of Lebanon is similar to that of Jordan. After signing the 
EMAA, Lebanon went on to conclude two APs, the second one of which expired in 
2015. In late 2016, the two sides agreed on partnership priorities and commitments 
under the EU-Lebanon Compact,94 thus confirming the region-wide trend of 
concluding and renewing bilateral instruments in a more focused and differentiated 
manner following the 2015 ENP review. 
The fraught domestic political landscape in Lebanon has been a near-constant 
source of hesitation for EU policy choices in the country and region. In particular, the 
dual role of the influential Hezbollah as militant group and political party in Lebanon 
poses difficulties for the EU’s engagement and it has been part of the reason why the 
EU has oscillated between a normative and a realist agenda in Lebanon.95 This has 
ultimately undermined the effectiveness of the ENP framework and the ability of the 
EU to stabilize the situation in the country and beyond through conflict resolution.96 
F. Libya 
Throughout most of the history of EU-MENA engagement, Libya, long under the 
authoritarian rule of Muammar Gaddafi, has been a notable outlier. Libya was not 
interested, for example, in concluding a bilateral agreement with the EEC in the 
1970s when virtually all other countries in the region had opted to do so. Nor was 
Libya included at the outset in the Barcelona Process due to the application of UN 
sanctions linked to the Lockerbie incident. Only after the two suspects of the 
bombing were surrendered by Libya in 1999 the UN lifted sanctions, prompting the 
inclusion of the country in the EMP as an observer. The ensuing improvement in 
international relations has, nonetheless, so far failed to yield a bilateral legal 
framework, which in turn impedes Libya’s ability to participate in the ENP.97 
Desirable as more legal certainty in EU-Libya relations may be, the absence of an 
international agreement with the EU has been the least of Libya’s problems in light of 
the country’s domestic situation, resembling a failed state after the uprising and 
military intervention that led to the death of Gaddafi in 2011.98 From the perspective 
of the EU, however, the conclusion of an agreement has been sought for more than 
a decade, primarily on the ground that it could help realizing the most important EU 
interest in Libya which has since risen to the absolute top priority of EU foreign policy 
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in the region: curbing irregular migration.99 Subsidiary commercial interests – Libya is 
an oil-rich country – which played a part in the prior normalization of relations with 
Libya have become of secondary importance at a time when political and military 
power is deeply fragmented.100 
For years now – long before Mediterranean migration routes became a regular 
feature of media and political discourse – the EU, and in particular Italy, has been 
cooperating with Libya on migrant returns and border surveillance, often in violation 
of international conventions.101 Similarly, discussions exploring the possibility of 
extraterritorial processing of asylum claims in Libya which have recently resurfaced 
were already being conducted ten years ago.102 Given the salience of the issue and 
the urgency of the situation, however, the EU is nowadays employing every 
instrument available: it has recently launched two Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) missions tasked essentially with countering human trafficking and 
smuggling in the Mediterranean, enhancing the capacities of the Libyan navy and 
coastguard, and improving border security.103 The EU has also boosted the 
capacities of its own border management agency, formerly known as Frontex, which 
takes part in counter-trafficking operations.104 
G. Morocco 
In 1987, Morocco applied for membership of the European Communities, but it was 
rejected on the ground that it did not qualify as a ‘European State’ for the purposes of 
what is today Article 49 TEU. The episode is indicative of Moroccan long-standing 
desire to be incorporated into European structures. Indeed, insofar as formal bilateral 
cooperation is concerned, Morocco has always been one of the most EU-integrated 
countries around the Mediterranean Sea. The list of bilateral agreements between 
the two parties is lengthy: EMAA, fisheries partnership agreement, two APs, 
including conferral of ‘advanced status’, protocol on partial liberalisation of trade in 
agricultural products, an aviation agreement, an MP, a bilateral dispute settlement 
mechanism,105 and others. Moreover, and despite slow progress attributable to a 
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downturn in relations, Morocco is in the process of negotiating a DCFTA and visa 
facilitation and readmission agreements. The myriad of agreements with their 
underlying financial incentives have undoubtedly motivated a degree of domestic 
reform in Morocco,106 but they have also been accused of ‘introducing a growing 
level of complexity and confusion’, especially in light of the concurrent overlapping 
regional initiatives.107 
One of the key stumbling blocks for the bilateral relationship is European reluctance 
to recognize the territory of Western Sahara as forming part of the Kingdom of 
Morocco. The UN and various actors in the international community have for 
decades failed to conclusively resolve the conflict between Front Polisario, the 
liberation movement representing the Sahrawi inhabitants of Western Sahara, and 
Morocco which calls the territory its ‘southern provinces’. The EU’s position has been 
mostly neutral – with the exception of the more vocal European Parliament – but in 
practice it has done little to help the Sahrawis’ self-determination cause, which was 
recognized as legitimate under international law, as this would damage the EU-
Morocco relationship.108 
The Western Sahara issue has managed to nonetheless considerably sour bilateral 
cooperation as a result of a case brought before the EU judiciary by Front Polisario. 
In first instance, the General Court found that Front Polisario could not only bring an 
action for annulment against an agreement between the EU and Morocco regarding 
the liberalisation of certain agricultural products (which was amending the EMAA), 
but that the agreement in question had to be annulled insofar as it applied to Western 
Sahara.109 On appeal, delivered almost exactly a year later in December 2016, the 
Court of Justice set aside the judgment of the General Court and ruled that Front 
Polisario could not challenge the EU-Morocco agreement. However, the Court of 
Justice made very clear, much to the anger of Morocco, that the EMAA – and by 
extension all other EU-Moroccan agreements with the same scope – does not apply 
to Western Sahara, as the territory is not part of Morocco under international law and 
its people have not consented to the liberalisation agreement.110 This means that the 
application of all EU-Morocco agreements to Western Sahara now requires a specific 
treaty provision to that effect, together with the consent of Western Sahara, making 
future bilateral agreements all the more difficult to conclude. Finally, it is noteworthy 
that the Court has found legally immaterial the fact that Morocco has been until now 
applying the EMAA to Western Sahara without any protest from the EU.111 
H. Palestine 
As the biggest financial donor, the EU plays a crucial role with respect to Palestinian 
state-building. The EU is also committed, at least rhetorically, to a two-state solution 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These two interconnected objectives are practically 
impossible to attain in the current context, where peace talks have effectively broken 
down and where Israel continues to expand its settlements in Palestinian territory. 
Although the European Parliament adopted a resolution supporting the recognition of 
Palestinian statehood in response to Israel’s unwillingness to advance the peace 
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process,112 thus attaching a ‘sense of urgency’ to the issue,113 the EU’s overall 
performance in Israeli-Palestinian affairs has ranged from irrelevant to incoherent, 
especially in light of its simultaneous bilateral cooperation with Israel.114 
Formal bilateral cooperation between the EU and Palestine is rendered more difficult 
as a result of the latter’s disputed international status. This is reflected, among 
others, in the EMAA which was concluded with the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, as, in the absence of universally recognized statehood, the PLO holds the 
claim to represent the Palestinian people.115 The interim agreement was made 
possible in the first place by the 1993 Oslo Accords, which provided for Palestinian 
self-administration by the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, the explicit territorial scope 
of the interim EMAA as applying to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip gives the 
Palestinians an important legal foothold for the conduct of international relations vis-
à-vis the EU without Israeli oversight and interference.116 The ‘interim’ status of the 
agreement stems from the fact that at the time of its conclusion the two parties 
expected a permanent resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian question that would allow 
for the signing of a standard EMAA. Needless to say, a permanent and balanced 
solution appears much less likely today than in the 1990s. 
I. Syria 
Since 2011, when the repression of an uprising by the Syrian government led to the 
outbreak of a violent conflict, the EU has suspended all its bilateral cooperation with 
the government of Bashar al-Assad. Cooperation has been replaced by a range of 
restrictive measures against Syria and its officials.117 The EU still provides assistance 
to people in Syria and refugees displaced in neighbourhood countries through a 
number of financing instruments, not least the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response 
to the Syrian Crisis (also known as ‘Madad Fund’). Overall, the crisis in Syria has 
made financing under the ENP framework more conflict-sensitive.118 
Even if bilateral relations between the EU and Syria were not suspended, the 
applicable legal framework has not been updated since the entry into force of the 
cooperation agreement in 1978.119 This is not for want of trying: an EMAA with Syria 
has been negotiated since 1998 and it was initialled twice (in October 2004 and 
December 2008) without being once signed or ratified.120 The first time it was the EU, 
driven in particular by France, who hesitated with the signing of the agreement as a 
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consequence of changes in political context in the region, triggered by the 
assassination of the prime minister of Lebanon, Rafic Hariri, who opposed Syrian 
influence in his country.121 The second time the Member States of the EU had 
unanimously agreed to sign the agreement in October 2009, only for Syria to request 
that the signing be postponed.122 
J. Tunisia 
In its general desire for close cooperation and integration with the EU, Tunisia has for 
the most part mirrored the quest of Morocco. By signing up to the multitude of 
agreements and initiatives of the EU, including a ‘privileged partnership’ in 2012, it 
has demonstrated its strategic orientation in international relations. Although Tunisia 
has in return become one of the main recipients of EU assistance in the ENP, the 
EU’s general prioritisation of its security and migration interests has been equally 
unwavering in its bilateral relations with Tunisia.123 At the same time, Tunisia has as 
a result become well-integrated into the EU’s security community.124 
Two aspects distinguish Tunisia from the Moroccan case and simultaneously permit 
a more positive outlook for EU-Tunisian relations, particularly from the EU’s point of 
view. First, Tunisia has no territorial dispute comparable to the Western Sahara issue 
and is in general a smaller country with less of a need (and ability) to project its 
power internationally. Second, Tunisia is generally perceived as the main – if not the 
only – success story of the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions. However, examples of 
successful democratisation around the Mediterranean are few and far between, 
which begs the question whether Tunisian democracy will be sustainable. It is also 
noteworthy that despite the EU’s staunch financial and rhetorical commitment to 
Tunisia’s democratic transformation, the EU’s support prior to the 2011 revolt 
resulted at times in the partial reinforcement of the preceding authoritarian regime of 
Ben Ali.125 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Bilateral cooperation between the EU and Mediterranean countries consists of a 
dense network of agreements and initiatives, each of which allows for a varying 
degree of differentiation. The conduct of formalized bilateral relations has 
significantly intensified following the initiation of the Barcelona process and adoption 
of the EMAAs. The trend continues to this day and is chiefly led by agreements and 
cooperation in the framework of the ENP. 
Countries have their specific contexts and these can be very powerful determinants 
of the possibilities of formal bilateral cooperation. Whereas the war and instability in 
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Libya and Syria preclude the development of almost any formal relations, other 
countries around the Mediterranean Sea, such as Tunisia, have become significantly 
integrated in the EU’s external governance frameworks. The instruments used to 
advance bilateral cooperation extend the reach of the EU’s external governance 
while effectuating as little internal change as possible.126 The greater burden to adapt 
and realize the objectives of bilateral instruments has always been predominantly on 
the EU’s partners in the Southern Mediterranean, as clearly evinced by the mobility 
partnerships and ENP action plans. The neutral legal and policy language of the 
instruments masks underlying power asymmetries and strategic interests of the EU, 
such as migration control. 
Even though the EU tends to follow the same ‘playbook’ and relies on a set of nearly 
identical instruments in developing its bilateral ties to the countries of the region, the 
outcome on the ground is bound to be differentiated as a result of the peculiarities 
marking each bilateral relationship. The examination of the formal aspects of 
cooperation reveals that the EU has been looking for ways in which it could 
accommodate the country specificities without abandoning the common principles 
underpinning its strategy towards the region. The adoption of partnership priorities 
with southern neighbourhood countries is the latest manifestation of this balancing 
act. However, its potential to enhance bilateral cooperation in the ENP will depend 
strongly on whether there will be sufficient political will. 
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